Sommers posed the question 'Do We Need Identity?' and answered in the negative. According to Sommers, the need for a special identity relation resulted from an arbitrary distinction between concept and object introduced by Frege and retained in modern predicate logic (MPL). This is reflected in the syntactic distinction between predicate and individual constant. Traditional formal logic (TFL) does not respect this distinction and, as a consequence, has no need for a special identity relation. But Sommers' position has not gained general acceptance. On the contrary, it has received considerable criticism.
Introduction
The question 'Do We Need Identity?' was raised by Sommers (4, 5] . He answered that a special identity relation is not needed in traditional formal logic (TFL), since predication and the laws governing it already allow identity to be expressed. But Frege injected a new, and arbitrary, distinction into modern predicate logic (MPL), which gave rise to the need for an identity relation.
The distinction is between concept and object, reflected in the syntactic distinction between predicate and individual constant (or name). Its import is that a predicate can predicate, but an individual constant cannot. Consequently, two individual constants can be related only under a binary predicate. In particular, two individual constants can be declared identical only by a binary identity relation.
TFL does not respect this distinction. In TFL an individual constant, denoting an object, can occupy the predicate position. For example, 'Hans is John' predicates the property (concept) of being John to Hans. But if 'John' is a predicate in 'Hans is John', consistency dictates that it is a predicate also in 'John is kind', and hence can be quantified. Thus 'some John is kind' must be well-formed, and must assert that the denotations of the predicates 'John' and 'kind' have nonempty intersection. Since 'John' is singular (i.e., denotes a singleton set), this is tantamount to asserting that the unique element in the set denoted by 'John' is a member of the set denoted by 'kind'. Therefore, 'John is kind' can be viewed as abbreviation for 'some John is kind'.
Because of the singularity of the predicate 'John', 'some John is kind' is equivalent to 'all John is kind'. To indicate that 'John' is thus simultaneously universally and existentially quantified, Sommers writes '*John is kind'. This he calls 'wild quantity'.
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When the arbitrary distinction between object and concept is eliminated, the need for a special identity relation disappears. Thus '*Hans is John' asserts that the denotations of the predicates 'Hans' and 'John' have nonempty intersection (equivalently, the denotation of 'Hans' is a subset of the denotation of 'John'), that is, are identical. Sommers gives a demonstration that for individual constants a and b, the unary predication '*a is b' in TFL has all the properties ascribed to the binary predication
But Sommers' position has not gained general acceptance. On the contrary, it has received considerable criticism. While it is conceded that '*a is b' can express the identity of individual constants, it is quickly pointed out that this falls far short of providing the expressiveness of the logical identity relation. But the precise extent of the deficit in expressiveness, if indeed there is any deficit, has not been determined.
It appears that Sommers' position on identity has not been adequately formalized to permit such a determination. This paper formalizes and extends Sommers' position on identity. This formalization is compared with MPL to define precisely the difference in expressive power. The conclusion is that it has less expressive power than MPL, but nonetheless does provide essentially all the expressiveness of the logical identity relation.
The formal language defined for this investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'PCS') is similar to the language of MPL (hereinafter referred to as 'PCI'). The similarity will not only facilitate comparison, but perhaps will also make PCS more palatable to readers whose experience and/or predisposition favors MPL. PCS differs from PCI in that the distinction between predicate and individual constant is not present.
In the following sections, the syntax and semantics of PCS are defined. Then the essential properties of singular expressions are established. To facilitate comparison, a conventional definition of PCI is provided. Translation from PCS to PCI demonstrates that PCS is equivalent to a subset of PCI. Translation from PCI to PCS is shown to be partial only, identifying a deficit in expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI. Therefore, there are wffs in PCI for which there are no semantically equivalent wffs in PCS.
However, for such a wff in PCI, there is a schema in PCS that expresses the same meaning. In particular, any theory that can be axiomatized with axiom schemas in PCI can be axiomatized with axiom schemas in PCS. The treatment throughout is semantic; however, an axiomatic treatment can also be given (see [3] ).
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This section defines PCS, a first-order language that formalizes and extends Sommers' ideas regarding singular terms. PCS resembles PCI, the language of MPL, with the following difference. Singular predicates supplant individual constants and functions. It is not unusual to treat individual constants as nullary functions, nor to treat n-ary functions as ( n + 1 )-ary predicates. But it appears that these devices have not been used together. When they are, the result is a uniformity in the treatment of individual constants, functions and predicates.
While PCS does not have an identity relation, identity of singular expressions, which correspond to terms in PCI, can be expressed. Moreover, deduction with identicals can be performed conveniently in PCS.
Syntax
The vocabulary of PCS is listed first. Let w+ := w-{0}. [1 ] ), but this will not be done here. Any member of a given equivalence class will be used to represent the class. Hence the two forms given above represent the same PCS expression.
In the sequel, parentheses are dropped whenever no confusion can result. Metavariables are used as follows: Rn ranges over Rn; sn ranges over Sn; pn ranges over Rn USn; x, y, z range over V; S ranges over singular expressions; and 4>, 'lj;, () range over expressions. Applying subscripts to these symbols does not change their ranges.
Semantics
An interpretation of PCS is a pair I = (V, 9) where V is a nonempty set and 9 is a mapping defined on P satisfying: depth(3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(xn)!\Sn+l(xt, ... , Xn, x)) · · ·)) := 1+max{depth(Si(xi)) :
The proof is a straightforward induction on the depth of S(x ).
In the following, Lemma 1 will be abbreviated 3!d E V: If= S[d].
THEOREM 2 IF 3xt(St(xt)A· · ·!\3xn(Sn(xn)A•</>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·) iffi f= •3x 1 (S 1 (xt)A · · · !\ 3xn(Sn(xn) !\ </>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·). proof: I F 3xt ( St (xt) !\ · · · !\ 3xn( Sn( Xn) !\ •</>( Xt, . .. , Xn)) · · ·) iff 3!d 1 · · · 3ldn : Xn) ) · .. ) iff I f= --,3x1(S1 (xt) /\ · · · /\ 3xn(Sn( Xn) /\ <P(xb ... , Xn)) · · ·) (follows from the definition of satisfaction and Lemma 1). COROLLARY 3 If= 3xt(St(Xt)A· · ·/\3xn(Sn(Xn)A¢>(xt, ... , Xn)) · · ·) iffi F 'Vxt(St(xt) ~ · · · ~ 'v'xn(Sn(xn) ~ <P(xb ... , Xn)) · · ·).
Using the notation of restricted quantification, this result can be recognized as asserting the 'wild quantity' of singular expressions, e.g., (3x : S(x))(¢>(x)) +-+ ('Vx :
S(x))(<P(x)). J(xiu· .. , Xim) ) .. ·)) (follows from the definition of satisfaction and Lemma 1).
Thus singular expressions distribute over conjunction. Examples, using the notation of restricted quantification, are: (3x: S(x))(¢>(x)/\¢(x)) +-+ ((3x: S(x))(¢>(x))A(3x:
S(x))(¢(x))) and ('Vx: S(x))(<P(x) /\ ¢()) +-+ (('v'x: S(x))(<P(x)) /\ ¢()).
The expressiveness of PCS relative to PCI will be investigated through the use of meaning-preserving translations between the two languages. Translation from PCS to PCI is not surjective. The difference of PCI and the image of PCS in PCI will give the deficit in expressiveness.
To facilitate definition of a translation function, a brief definition of PCI will first be given. This definition is standard, but chosen to parallel the definition of PCS given in Section 2.
Definition of PCI
The vocabulary of PCI consists of the following. is not empty is shown next.
Consider the unary predicate m E PCI and let .,p = 3xtVx2(m(x2) +-+ (x2 = Xt)). iff I F 3xl(Sl(xl) A 3x2(S2(x2) A m(xt,x2))) (definition of satisfaction) iff I F 3x(S1(x) A S2(x)) (schema 1.) iff 
